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[MARCH of environmental protection. Suppose further that these costs are fixed for industry as a whole at J and that each of the n firms in the market is obliged to shoulder an equal share of these costs, J/n.1 Next period's real2 aggregate demand will be Y, where, in this section, Y is known with certainty. We suppose each firm garners an equal share of aggregate demand, so its future demand constraint is Y/n. The firm's future supply constraint is based on current productive investment, If/v. When next period comes, the firm will produce min (If/v, Y/n) units of output, requiring an equivalent amount of employment. The firm will utilise min (If, vY/n) units of capital, and the rate of capacity utilisation will be min (i, vY/nIf ).
Define or as real gross profits (before interest payments, taxes, and depreciation) per unit of utilised capital. It is related to the real wage, w, by the wage-profit frontier:
We consider policies which raise or by reducing w. For example, suppose the labour market clears, so the real wage equals the supply price of labour.3 Suppose further that labour is supplied with perfect elasticity4 such that the after-tax real wage equals the dole, w~. Thus, w = W(I-t,), where tw, represents the personal tax rate on labour. (We assume that the government's budget is balanced, so all revenues which are not spent on the dole are spent on other non-investment goods.) Thus, we may consider policies which raise or by reducing w~ and/or t,. Alternatively, the analysis is equally applicable to incomes policies which directly reduce w, raising 7r. When the context is clear, we will refer to 7T, profitability on utilised capital, as simply 'profitability'. It is assumed to hold the same value in both periods, and is known with certainty. In the presence of corporate income taxes, firms finance their productive and non-productive investment, If + J/n, by one-period debt issues, thereby incurring an obligation next period of r (If + J/n), where r is unity plus the risk-free real interest rate. The firm will utilise min (If, vY/n) units of productive capital, earning a gross profit of Tmin (If, vY/n). Pre-tax earnings, therefore, will be 7Tmin (If, vY/n) -r (If + J/n). After-tax earnings are (i -t) times pre-tax earnings, where t, is the corporate tax rate. We assume all after-tax earnings are distributed as dividends, so the net returns to shareholders are It is immediately obvious that the firm will maximise net returns to shareholders by choosing If = vY/n, provided or > r. At this point, we may pause to confirm assertion (i), mentioned above: aggregate investment, I =_ nIf = vY, is 1 The significance of these fixed costs is discussed in Section IIE, below. 2 In this paper, all variables are in real terms. We assume there are no outside nominal assets. Thus, we do not address the absolute price level and the real balance effect. For a new approach to these issues, see Costrell (I 98 I a).
3 For the purposes of this paper, we have considered it useful to avoid a distracting treatment of involuntary unemployment. See Costrell (I983) for a suggested approach to the cyclical behaviour of the real wage in the presence of involuntary unemployment. ' This assumption may not be too far off, provided that the economy is well below full employment. In any case, the main results can be sustained in a model where the real wage moves procyclically along a labour supply curve of finite, though highly positive elasticity. Details are available on request.
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independent of 7T and of the margin between profitability and interest, provided that the margin is non-negative. It is also independent of t. Thus, even if interest were considered exogenous, investment would not be stimulated by increasing after-tax profitability. (As we shall see, this partial equilibrium result is not robust with respect to the introduction of demand uncertainty, a fact which is the basis for Malinvaud's analysis.) The general equilibrium value of the interest rate is easily discerned, using the competitive assumption that entry drives the net return to shareholders to zero. (Otherwise, shareholders would be earning rents. The following result is unchanged if, in the absence of corporate taxes, some or all of the investment funds come from equity.) Setting (2) equal to zero, we endogenise r:
I+ J vY+
In this model, without uncertainty, fixed costs Jare all that keep the interest rate below profitability: profits on productive capital, nI, must cover interest on all capital, r (I+ J). At this juncture, we may confirm point (ii): the ratio Ir/r, representing the spread between profitability and interest, is independent of the level of or and, trivially, of t,. (As we shall see, this result, which is critical for the general equilibrium determination of investment, is robust with respect to the introduction of demand uncertainty, except for second-order effects to be discussed.)
Finally, we may easily determine current aggregate demand and output. Current aggregate demand is most simply given by the multiplier relation Yo = I/s, where s is the average propensity to save. Output is given by min (Io/v, Y0), where 10 is the inherited capital stock. In this paper we are primarily concerned with the demand-constrained case, Y0 < Io/v.
The average propensity to save is likely to be a positive function of after-tax interest, primarily because of distribution effects between owners of capital, on the one hand, who save some part of their income, and, on the other hand, workers and/or the government, who save nothing. But policies which increase profitability by driving down the real wage, raise r pari passu, by (3). Thus we may confirm point (iii): such policies not only fail to raise investment, they may be expected to reduce current output and employment, by the paradox of thrift. (This observation is also robust with respect to the introduction of demand uncertainty, as we shall see.) Similarly, balanced budget reductions in the personal tax rate on interest may also raise s and reduce current output and employment: the balanced budget multiplier is a variant of the paradox of The analysis requires a bit more careful attention to-the portfolio decisions of owners of capital and to the markets for shares and bonds which mediate the decisions of firms and their owners. In the first period owners receive dividends, principal and interest from previously held shares and bonds. These payments are made from current production. Owners supply some fraction of the firms' investment capital to prepare for second-period production and, in so doing, create shares. Owners maximise expected utility by allocating current income between consumption and savings and by allocating their savings between shares and bonds in anticipation of second-period dividends and interest. Firms invest to maximise net wealth of shareholders, issuing one-period bonds to supplement the shareholders' capitalisation. Share and bond markets clear. The no-rent condition takes the form of driving net wealth of shareholders to zero, i.e. driving market value of shares to the replacement cost of equity capital. These relationships simultaneously determine the risk-free real interest rate and investment. Provided there is excess capacity, first period output and employment equilibrate savings and investment in a demand-constrained multiplier fashion.
Formally, we consider the maximisation problems of owners and their firms. Preferences of owner h are represented by an intertemporal von NeumannMorgenstern utility function, which, for simplicity, we take to be identical for all owners. Furthermore, we take it to be additively separable in current consumption Co (non-stochastic) and future consumption C: (stochastic). Thus, owners make savings and portfolio decisions to maximise 
To interpret this expression, consider for the moment the simple case of riskneutrality, where U' is constant. In this case, the first term on the RHS would be the expected gross profits for firmf, discounted by the risk-free interest factor r. Thus, in the absence of risk-aversion, this expression would equate the value of firmf's equity and debt, Vf + af(If + J/n), to the discounted value of expected gross profits. Equivalently, this expression would equate the interest factor to expected gross profits per unit of equity plus debt. Expression (7) shows how this relation is modified for risk aversion. This is, the non-constant U' terms (U" < o) introduce a risk premium between the risk-free interest rate and the expected profit rate. The second step of the overall maximisation programme is for the firms, in the name of their owners, to maximise net wealth of shareholders, i.e. market value of shares minus the original equity capital. In light of (7) The LHS is non-increasing in If, so the firm's decision rule is to expand investment until the LHS falls to r. Thus, the LHS serves as firmf's marginal efficiency of capital.
Malinvaud explains a simple version of (9), where U' is constant.3 In that case, firms expand capacity up to the point where the expected benefit of additional capacity equals the cost of installing it, r. The expected benefit of additional capacity is simply the rate of profitability on utilised capital times the probability that sufficient demand will materialise to utilise it, jr g (Y) dY. Our expression nlf/v (g) is modified by the (non-constant) U' terms, to account for risk aversion, but the essential logic is intact.
We may digress here for a moment to reproduce Malinvaud's partial equilibrium point that profitability stimulates risky investment, holding interest constant. Considering the simple version of (9) (leaving aside effects of 7r on U' (Ch)), it is immediately obvious that increases in profitability shift the marginal efficiency curve upwards. Holding r constant, of course, this would indeed stimulate investment, in contrast to point (i) under certainty. Our general equilibrium analysis below will differ from Malinvaud in two ways: (i) our analysis will include the effects of 7r on U' (Ch), the income effects on risk aversion; and more importantly, (2) we will treat interest endogenously.
1 See also Diamond's discussion of his equations (2 i) and (22), which relates this result to the Modigliani-Miller theorem.
2 The assumption that the firm takes C' and, therefore, U'(C') as parametric may deserve some comment. By adopting the convention of the representative individual, we have implicitly assumed that owners diversify their holdings among all firms (of which we suppose there are many). Hence, firmf's decisions would have negligible impact on the representative individual's consumption, and, therefore, on marginal utility. Of course, firmf's decisions have a non-negligible impact on the aggregate wealth of its owners, given in (8). It should be noted, however, that the assumption of diversification is a bit strained in the present model, since risks are perfectly correlated among firms, which vitiates the usual rationale for diversification. We now state the equilibrium conditions. First we note that although each of the identical firms and owners takes the actions of other firms and owners as parametric, in equilibrium their actions will be identical. Thus the aggregate values, our focus, are given by We now gather our optimisation and equilibrium conditions together in a system which solves for I, r, CO, and YO, contingent upon the policies which govern w and hence, by (i), ir.1 The system turns out to be conveniently blockrecursive (because of our simplifying assumption of intertemporally separable utility): we can solve for I and r before considering CO and YO.
To write the subsystem for I and r, we must first write down the equilibrium distribution of Ch, call it CJh*. Imposing ( owners with a better (worse) margin between profitability on invested capital and interest. This, of course, is required to induce the wealthier and more (less) risk-averse owners to hold the risky shares, priced once again at replacement cost. Arrow's original presentation of the degree of relative risk aversion argued convincingly that relative risk aversion is likely to be an increasing function of income. His arguments were based on both casual empirical evidence on the demand for cash and on sophisticated theoretical considerations. The theoretical argument showed that if the utility function is bounded from below and above, as is, in fact, required to solve the St Petersburg paradox,' then R(Z) must exceed unity for arbitrarily large values of Z and must be less than unity for values of Z arbitrarily close to zero.2 Thus, he concluded, 'it is broadly permissible to assume that relative risk aversion increases with wealth, though theory does not exclude some fluctuations.'3 Thus, for our model, the most likely case is dIldir < o: policies which raise profitability by reducing the real wage are likely to dampen investment, though this second-order effect may not be dramatic. The first three bracketed terms on the RHS are positive, so whatever depressing effect profitability has on investment will depress current output and employment. This is simply the-investment multiplier at work.
The last three bracketed terms reflect the effects of no on the propensity to save: the middle term represents the substitution effect; it is opposed by the third term, the usual income effect on savings out of given current income; and the first term captures the redistributional effect of increasing owners' current income at the expense of spending out of wage income (either directly by workers or indirectly by the government or its transfer recipients). If the redistributional and sub-I78 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MARCH stitution effects outweigh the income effect, as is commonly believed, the propensity to save is a positive function of profitability. In equation (24) we see that this provides a further dampening impact of profitability on cttrrent income and employment. This is simply the paradox of thrift at work. To summarise, we have two ways in which increased profitability affects output and employment: by way of the propensities to save and invest. It seems likely that increased profitability increases the economy's propensity to save while reducing the propensity to invest in risky physical assets. The result is an excess demand for risk-free assets, bonds. This is resolved by the multiplier process, depressing output and employment. In simple algebraic terms, YO = I/s, where s is the average propensity to save; this model suggests that increased profitability is likely to depress output and employment by decreasing the numerator and increasing the denominator. This reproduces (or strengthens) point (iii) from the certainty model.
We may also note that even if investment is slightly stimulated (decreasing relative risk aversion) it is entirely possible for the paradox of thrift to outweigh the investment stimulus and, thus, for increased profitability to reduce current output and employment. That is, if increased profitability stimulates investment by less than it stimulates savings out of current income, then current income must fall: increased profitability may well raise the denominator of I/s by a greater proportion than the numerator.
(D) Extensions
The assumption of fixed coefficients is an obvious candidate for relaxation. It is easy to see, however, that this would only strengthen our results. Reducing the real wage to raise profitability (and interest) would, under neoclassical technology, lead firms to meet their stochastic future demand with more labourintensive techniques, thus dampening investment. Also, we have assumed that the subjective distribution of future demand is independent of current demand, YO. Relaxing this assumption would also strengthen our results. The natural assumption to make is that g( Y) is adversely affected by reductions in YO. Therefore, since our model suggests that increased profitability reduces I and YO for given g(Y), the effect of YO on g(Y) would exacerbate matters. This is a straightforward accelerator argument about income-induced investment.
Finally, we may consider the impact of taxation on capital income. This raises complications about the mix of equity and external finance, but otherwise the analysis is quite similar to that provided above. Results are available on request which suggest that reductions in taxation on capital income are even more likely to dampen investment, output and employment than are reductions in the real wage. Neither method of raising after-tax profitability helps investment circumvent the stochastic demand constraint, and both methods are likely to increase relative risk aversion.
(E) The Impact of Fixed Costs on Investment (a Digression)
In the certainty model, we found that I = vY independent of or and also of fixed costs, J. The only impact of Jwas to drive a wedge between or and r, so that profits on production capital could cover interest on non-production capital as well.
In the model with uncertainty, however, fixed costs play a more significant role. Examination of (i9) shows that dI/dJ > o. Graphically, reducing Jshifts up the curve of (I4), in Fig. I , raising r and reducing L Indeed, as Jvanishes, r -+ 7r and I -vYmin. That is, were it not for fixed costs, investment would be limited to meet certain demand only: no risky investment would be undertaken. These fixed costs may be interpreted as entry costs, rather like the ante in a poker game. A high ante induces the players to stay in the game longer.
III. CONCLUSION
This paper began with a brief discussion of supply-constrained and demandconstrained models in which greater after-tax profitability increases investment. The model of this paper contrasts sharply with both.
The contrast of the present model with supply-constrained models is straightforward. In supply-constrained models, greater after-tax profitability increases the propensity to save and thus allows greater investment. In the present model, greater profitability may well increase the propensity to save, but if investment demand is not stimulated, this only serves to depress aggregate demand.
The contrast of the present model with demand-constrained models such as Malinvaud or textbook IS/LM models turns on the rent vs. no-rent assumption. Under the no-rent assumption, a rather dramatic result was deduced: increased profitability primarily raises interest and probably reduces investment demand. This result, however, should not be taken to imply that policies which reduce after-tax profitability would fare much better. Such policies may be successful over a limited range, but would ultimately bring the economy up against its supply constraint. At that point investment becomes governed by the propensity to save, which is probably adversely affected by policies which reduce after-tax profitability and interest. That is, neither policies which decrease nor increase after-tax profitability are likely to stimulate much investment, albeit for different reasons: a decrease runs into supply problems, an increase runs into demand problems.' Ifit were possible to improve entrepreneurial expectations while simultaneously increasing after-tax profitability, then the expectations would stimulate private investment demand, while the profitability would allow private savings to increase and finance it. Traditional types of demand management may help here, but our understanding of the formation of expectations may still be inadequate to the task of manipulating them. Even the doctrine of rational expectations, which has contributed so much to our understanding, is incomplete: rational expectations are fundamentally indeterminate for non-degenerate models.2 In short, as Keynes wrote, private investment is yet at the mercy of 'animal spirits' and 'the nerves and hysteria and even the digestions and reactions to the weather i80 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MARCH of those upon whose spontaneous activity it [investment] largely depends'.1 As a result, Keynes's case for more direct public influence over investment is not without merit, though in an era of obsolete capacity (where supply constraints also bind), it may require an accompanying degree of austerity to provide the necessary savings. Finally, let us return to the role of rents in stimulating private investment. Malinvaud's analysis in this JOURNAL is noteworthy because it suggests that if rents are to be sustained, the government may have to override the market mechanism. In particular, Malinvaud argues for a policy of stimulating private investment by increasing private rents (or 'pure' profits) over a long run with an effective, comprehensive incomes policy covering interest rates as well as wages. This brings the margin between profitability and interest (hence, rents) directly under government nuanagement.2
Many industrial policies may also be interpreted as methods of bypassing market mechanisms to increase rents and stimulate private investment, usually in particular sectors, but conceivably in the economy at large. Government loan guarantees and public investment banking (low-interest government loans) are important examples.3
Weaker policies to stimulate investment by increasing rents may be dubious over the long run. They would include the IS/LM suggestion that easy money can reduce r relative to n. They would also include recent U.S. fiscal policies aimed at raising after-tax profitability by reducing tax rates on capital income, and reducing the supply price of labour through tax and transfer policies.4 In the short run, rents may appear and stimulate investment, but this would largely depend on the degree to which such changes were unanticipated. Anticipated increases in after-tax profitability would presumably raise after-tax real interest rates, choking off rents and investment.
A more significant possibility for policies aimed at after-tax profitability concerns open economies. It may well be that international capital flows equalise interest rates more readily than profit rates. Thus, individual countries (and regions) may try to increase rents by raising profitability relative to the exogenous world interest rate. These policies have often succeeded in stimulating domestic investment (or at least deterring capital flight) and attracting foreign investment in the short run. Such individual policies, however, run the risk of setting off a 1 Keynes (I964), p. I63. 2 Such an incomes policy may not be sufficient to stimulate investment, in Malinvaud's view, since it may, by redistributional effects, aggravate demand problems and, hence, investment, along the accelerator lines discussed in II D, above. Thus, he argues that incomes policy should be dovetailed with aggregate demand management.
3 In considering programmes of low-interest government loans, it may be important to distinguish between their effects on the marginal cost of capital and the average cost of capital. It would seem that the former effect is more important in inducing firms to move down their marginal efficiency schedules, expanding investment. This would suggest that if low-interest loans are tied to indivisible projects, then those projects should be low-yield marginal projects which would otherwise have not been executed. It would also suggest certain guidelines for low-interest loans which are not tied to indivisible projects, but which rather are supplied to firms with divisible investment programmes. Such loans should not be strictly rationed in amounts so small that private finance remains the marginal source of capital. It might be preferable for the government to stipulate that firms obtain first a fixed amount of private finance, after which low-interest government loans are available in generous quantities. 4 See Economic Report of the President (i 982), especially chapter 5.
